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THE PROPOSED FEDERAL MERCHANT AIRSHIP ACT AND ITS COMPARISON WITH
THE EXISTING MARYLAND ACT
EDGAR ALLAN POE, JR.*

Senator McNary has just introduced into the 72nd Congress,
a bill identical to the one introduced last year and above referred
to as the "Merchant Airship Act." Just what does this Federal
Act seek to accomplish and what are its provisions? Looking
upon the Act as a whole, the first impression that one gets is the
limitation of its scope. Throughout, it applies specifically and only
to air carriers engaged exclusively in foreign commerce and purposely excludes all air carriers engaged in interstate commerce.
It even goes further than this, in that in Sections 1, 2, 19 and 20
it only uses the word "airship", although in its numerous other
sections, the words "airship and other aircraft" are used consistently. Probably, it was intended that the words "airship and
other aircraft" should be used consistently throughout, but a literal
interpretation of the phraseology as actually used, makes the four
sections above enumerated apply only to the zeppelin or dirigible
type of airship, excluding aircraft heavier than air. Furthermore,
the Federal Act appears to purposely cover only aircraft engaged
in overseas transportation. This is brought out very forcibly by
the caption to the Bill and also by the fact that practically the
entire Bill is based on United States Statutes, relative to the maritime law of the United States. In fact, the phraseology is so nearly
identical to the Harter Act and to other maritime statutes that except for a few small, but exceedingly important, provisions, they
are the same, to all intents and purposes.
This, of course, immediately brings this question to the forenamely, can Congress constitutionally legislate on matters relating
solely to air carriers when such legislation is based on the constitutional grant of maritime jurisdiction? The grant of jurisdiction over navigable waters cannot possibly be construed to extend
to navigation of the air. However, under the interstate and foreign
commerce clause of the constitution, Congress can undoubtedly
pass legislation relative to air carriers engaged in interstate and
*Of the Maryland Bar. Member, American Bar Association Committee
on Aeronautical Law.
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foreign commerce. Due to this far-reaching grant of power, the
substantive part of the Proposed Federal Act would probably stand
up under a constitutional test, but the Bill goes further than this
and attempts to define what procedure shall be used. In fact, the
Bill states that proceedings must be brought "in any United States
District Court", presumably without a jury. This seems to me to be
an attempt on the part of Congress to grant jurisdiction not permissible under the Constitution. An aircraft, while in flight, is
not within the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction and Congress is,
therefore, without power to give to the District Courts of the
United States, as admiralty courts of the first instance, authority
to hear proceedings for limitation of liability and apportionment
of damages with regard to causes of action arising during such
flight, except as hereinafter qualified. However, due to the fact,
as previously stated, this Bill apparently seeks to limit its application to carriers not only in foreign commerce but in overseas transportation, this criticism may prove to be more theoretical than
practical.
Our immediate interest in the relation between aviation and
admiralty is in the domain of torts. So, let us suppose an aircraft
falls into navigable waters and a passenger is injured in the water
or a passing vessel is damaged. The act or omission which caused
the aircraft to fall, occurs in the air, but it becomes injuriously
effective in the water. Now, under such conditions, may not both
the passenger and vessel owner have recourse to admiralty? Under
such circumstances, it is well settled in principle, that locality
being the test of admiralty jurisdiction in tort, it is the locality of
the person or thing injured and not the locality of the origin of
the injury that is decisive. Where the injury has its origin on
navigable waters but is consummated in the air, it is not within
the admiralty jurisdiction, but, conversely, where the consummation of the injury happens on navigable waters, it is within the
admiralty jurisdiction, although it originated in the air. Thus it
seems reasonably clear that if the occupant of the falling aircraft
is injured in navigable waters, admiralty alone has jurisdiction of
the cause of action. This certainly is true if locality is the sole
test of admiralty jurisdiction and that locality is the sole test has
been repeatedly reaffirmed by the highest judicial authority of this
country. The Supreme Court has held that:
"It is clearly established that the jurisdiction of admiralty over a maritime tort does not depend on the wrong having been committed on board
vessels, but rather upon its having been committed on navigable waters."
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The Federal Bill was apparently written with the idea of aiding and assisting the contemplated Goodyear-Zeppelin Corporation.
This company has planned to design and build four large type dirigibles to be used in a transatlantic service between ports of the
United States and cities in foreign countries. This fact probably
explains why the term "airship" was used in four sections of the
Bill. "Airship" is in air parlance different from "aircraft" and
refers to an aircraft using gas lighter than air as a means of
support and having a means of propulsion. Aircraft, on the other
hand, means any contrivance for navigation of or flight in the air
and includes aircraft both heavier than air and lighter than air.
But assuming that the Federal Bill does not contemplate only overseas transportation but that these air carriers, after completing their
transatlantic flight, attempt to take passengers to, let us say Berlin,
or some other inland city; that after crossing the Atlantic safely,
the dirigible explodes somewhere over Germany and numerous
passengers are killed or injured; then clearly there would be no
maritime jurisdiction and the question would then arise as to
whether or not Congress had the power to provide that the limitation of liability provisions in the Bill should be brought in "any
United States District Courts". The constitution of the United
States provides under Article VII of the Amendments that:
"In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law."

Clearly, any action for personal injuries or for loss of property
or merchandise would be a common law action and because this is
true, the question immediately arises, can Congress pass legislation
limiting liability when the constitution of the United States expressly provides that in common law actions, the verdict of the
jury is final and conclusive. Here again, this may be an objection
more theoretical than practical, because in the vast majority of
severe aircraft accidents, very few passengers are injured. Generally, death ensues and, of course, there is no right at common
law for a pecuniary recovery, based on wrongful death. Consequently, there being no common law right for an action because of
wrongful death, Congress would not be contravening the United
States Constitution by passing the liability provisions of the Federal Act, in all cases where passengers were killed rather than injured. But in instances where personal injuries were received and

THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW

in all cases where property or merchandise carried by the aircraft
was lost or injured, Article VII of the Constitution of the United
States would apply with full force and effect and the legislation
authorizing limitation of liability in a District Court of the United
States would be unconstitutional and void, unless saved by the
theory of a contractual relationship.
Next, there is the grave and exceedingly important question
as to why Congress should pass this Bill, temporarily assuming
that no legal or technical objections existed. The Bill, as already
stated, does not seek to protect by its limitation of liability provisions, any company in the United States doing an interstate business. The interstate air carriers of this country have expended
enormous sums of money and have done a colossal amount of work
in developing and effecting their network of air routes, which at
the present time enmesh the United States from border to border
and from ocean to ocean. In spite of the efficiency of their management and their successful efforts to cut costs to a minimum,
none of them except one company, whose flying routes make it a
special exception, at the present time can show profits from passenger traffic alone. Were it not for the air mail contracts, which
amount to a government subsidy, all of them would show loss.
The tempo of this country is probably faster than that of any
other in the world and its distances between points are stupendous.
Consequently, it is particularly fitting, not only to the psychology
of the inhabitants but also the geographical set-up of the United
States itself, that interstate carriers should receive all the help and
encouragement possible. Accidents, of course, at times are unavoidable and where a number of prominent passengers are killed,
the cost of settling the claims or paying the verdict, where it is an
adverse one, are enormous and immediately establish a large deficit in the company's operating expenses. Insurance premiums are
so high that they are almost prohibitive and form a most substantial operating cost. This being so, it can readily be seen why
Congress should initiate and pass legislatign which will assist the
interstate carriers in this country to operate. If aviation is to
progress, or even survive, it is necessary that it have some sort
of Government aid. This aid must come from one of two sources,
either as a subsidy now disguised in the form of mail contracts or
else a limitation of liability as expressed in the Federal Act.
At the present time, the Federal Act limits the liability of the
owner of any aircraft engaged in foreign commerce for any loss
or destruction of any property or merchandise shipped on such
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aircraft, or for any loss or injury caused by collision, or for any
loss or damage done to such property or merchandise, provided
such loss is incurred without the privity or knowledge of such
owner, to the value of the interests of such owner in such aircraft
and her freight then pending. This limitation of liability as previously stated, has been adopted from the admiralty statutes and it
is fair to assume that should this Act become law and should it be
held to be constitutional, its application would be interpreted in
accordance with similar decisions rendered by the admiralty courts.
These courts have held that the value of the vessels and their
freight then pending, refers to the value after a collision or stranding, or other injury, and not to the value before such collision or
other injury. Generally, in the case of shipping, there is not a total
loss. Something is generally salvaged and consequently the shipper
losing goods or merchandise, or having them injured, is not without
redress. However, in the case of airships and other aircraft, the
reverse is true. If a zeppelin explodes, or an airplane crashes,
the value of the wreckage is insignificant and consequently there
would be little or nothing for the shipper to recover. It would
seem, therefore, that it would be more equitable for the limitation
of liability to extend to the value of the aircraft before an accident rather than afterwards and appropriate words should be inserted in Section 5 of the Federal Act to cover this.
Another question arises under this Section 5, namely, whether
it includes damage caused to persons or property on the ground
by the fall of an aircraft or objects falling from said aircraft. It
would seem that Section 5 was sufficiently broad for it specifically
limits liability by "any loss, damage or injury by collision", or "for
any act, matter or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture done, etc."
Certainly, there is nothing in this Section which limits collision to a
collision in the air and when an aircraft comes in contact with
mother earth, surely a collision exists, both legally and actually.
The whole purpose of the Federal Act is to limit the liability
of the aircraft owner and consequently, a broad interpretation of
this section would be in keeping with the fundamental object of the
entire bill. Here again, the question arises-would such limitation
as to parties other than passengers and shippers be legal? The
present State laws in the majority of the States unfortunately make
"the owner of every aircraft which is operated over the lands or
waters of this State, absolutely liable for injury to persons or property on the lands or waters beneath caused by the ascent, descent
or flight of the aircraft, or the dropping or falling of any objects
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therefrom, whether such owner was negligent or not, unless the
injury is caused in whole or in part by the negligence of the person
injured, or of the owner or bailee of the property injured." Thus,
it is readily seen that the owner as such is absolutely liable for
injuries to persons and for injuries to property on the lands or
waters beneath, and that such liability exists, whether such owner
was negligent or not. This law is obviously most unfair, in that
it makes the owner as such of any aircraft absolutely liable, regardless of the conditions existing which caused the accident. A
few cases will suffice to explain this.
Let us suppose that an airplane, properly inspected, equipped
and operated, has a collision with another plane, due to the negligent operation of the latter. As a result of the collision, the first
plane falls upon a house, demolishes it and kills some of the inmates. Suit is then brought against the owner of the plane doing
this damage, and all the testimony conclusively shows that the
plane doing the injury was without fault. Yet, nevertheless, under
the above quoted statute, the defendant owner would be liable.
The same thing would apply should a lightning bolt or any
other act of God, which could in no way be anticipated, cause the
plane to fall upon the house mentioned. Even if the owner of a
plane kept it under lock and key in his private hangar and thieves
broke into this hangar and stole the plane, causing the injury already alluded to, due to negligent operation, the owner would still
be liable, even if the thief made a full confession and admitted
entire responsibility.
Let us go one step further and assume that the thief above
referred to negligently crashed this stolen airplane into a gas tank
on the outskirts of the City of New York and that as a result
the majority of that metropolis was razed to the ground by the
ensuing fire. The innocent owner of the plane would theoretically
be legally liable for this entire damage, amounting to billions of
dollars. It is reasonable to suppose that the authors of this unfortunate piece of legislation did not contemplate such results but
this does not alter the fact that the law exists as stated and illustrated. Therefore, if this portion of Section 5 of the Federal Act
does not cover injury to persons or property on the ground, it
would be most advisable and advantageous to re-write it so that
there would be no doubt or difficulty of its application thereto.
Equally in importance with Section 5 of the Federal Act is
Section 12. Briefly this 12th Section holds that:
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"If the owner of any aircraft engaged in foreign commerce transporting persons, merchandise, or property shall exercise due diligence to
make such aircraft in all respects airworthy and properly manned, equipped
and supplied, neither the aircraft nor owner, agent, nor charterer shall
be responsible for injury or damage resulting from faults or errors in
navigation or in the management of said aircraft nor shall the aircraft,
her owner, etc., be held liable for losses arising from dangers of the air,
acts of God, or public enemies, or the inherent defect, quality or vice of the
thing carried, or from insufficiency of package or seizure under legal process or for loss resulting from any act or omission of the shipper or owner
of the goods, his agent or representative, or from saving or attempting to
save life or property, or from any deviation in rcndering such service."

This Section corresponds to the Harter Act in every detail,
with this important exception: The Federal Act includes persons.
while the Harter Act only covers merchandise or property.
It has been universally held by the Federal Courts that the
Harter Act does not apply to claims for loss of baggage or claims
for death or personal injury on the ground that such claims have
nothing to do with the relations between vessel and cargo. Thus,
the present contemplated Federal Act goes far beyond the Harter
Act, in that it does include baggage, personal injury, and death
claims. Thus, the owner of aircraft, engaged in foreign commerce,
will be under no liability to pay damages for death or injury to
passengers, or for loss of baggage if the owner of such aircraft
exercises "due diligence to make the aircraft in all respects airworthy, properly equipped and supplied." This exemption from liability stands for the benefit of not only the aircraft itself but also
her owner, agent or partner and applies even if the loss or injury
is caused by "Faults or errors in navigation or in the management" of the aircraft, acts of God, etc. To put it briefly, the owner
under the Federal Act will be free of liability for all those accidents which he does not directly control, including the negligence
of his employees engaged in the operation of the aircraft.
The same objections which were raised in connection with
Section 5 apply here with full force and effect, namely, as to
whether this total exemption from liability violates the constitutional guarantee of a trial by jury of all common law civil cases.
The act is probably constitutional with relation to passengers killed,
whether over land or sea because no common law right existed for
wrongful death claims. Also, the exemption from liability would
probably hold in all cases of injury or damage to persons, merchandise or property, where the place of injury was in navigable
waters, because then maritime jurisdiction would exist. But where
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the injury to persons, merchandise or property takes place over
land rather than over navigable waters, there would be no maritime jurisdiction, and the common law rights guaranteed by the
constitution of the United States would apply and the act to this
extent might be void and unenforceable, as hereinafter discussed.
Just as the Interstate Commerce Commission allows the railroads
to limit their liability on passenger baggage, based on a graduated
scale or premium payment, so undoubtedly the owner of aircraft
engaged in foreign commerce could limit his liability for damage
and injury to baggage belonging to the passengers by the same
method. But that would still leave open the question of his liability on all common law damage suits for personal injuries occurring anywhere other than in navigable waters.
There is still another question involved in this proposed Federal Act which needs clarifying. As already frequently stated, the
Act applies only to carriers in foreign commerce and the Act undertakes to define foreign commerce as follows:
"The term 'foreign commerce' means commerce between the United

States or possessions or territories of the United States and foreign countries, or between the United States and possessions or territories of the
United States, or between foreign countries. The term 'United States'

when used in a geographical sense means the several states and the District
of Columbia.

The term 'possession of the United States' is including the

Panama Canal Zone."
But it is not clear from the terms of the Federal Act whether an
aircraft engaged in foreign commerce, as above defined, can or
cannot make intermediate stops. If the ultimate destination of
the flight governs the determination of whether or not the aircraft
is engaged in foreign commerce, then the act will be subject to
many abuses, because carriers which are primarily interstate carriers could by extending their routes across the borders of neighboring countries easily take advantage of the exemption of liability
and limitation of liability of this Act and thus obtain a very gross
and unfair advantage over other competing interstate carriers whose
routes would not permit them to do this. For example, a company sending its planes from New York to Los Angeles could,
without any loss of time and with very little expense, have as its
ultimate destination Agua Caliente, lower California, Mexico.
Similarly, a company sending planes from New York to Seattle
could use Vancouver as its ultimate destination and planes coming from San Francisco to Detroit could land on the Canadian
shore. On the other hand, planes leaving Washington for St.
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Louis would be unable to do this and consequently any competition with carriers who might be in a position to use foreign soil
as their ultimate destination, would be disastrous and in the long
run, probably impossible. Thus, it appears advisable, if not necessary, to definitely clarify this point.
The Federal Act is an exceedingly lengthy bill, comprising
19 pages and I cannot attempt in this article to analyze separately
all of the different Sections. I have gone into the liability features of Section 12 with a great deal of thoroughness, because
they are by far the most important features of the Bill. Section
3 enumerates a long list of valuable articles such as jewelry, money,
etc., and then states that unless these articles are truthfully marked
and valued, the owner of the aircraft is not liable for their loss
or destruction in any form or manner. Section 4 exempts the
owner of any aircraft from loss or damage to merchandise caused
by fire, unless such fire is caused by the design or negligence of
such owner. Section 5 has been thoroughly discussed. Sections 6,
7 and 8 relate to procedure and have already been carefully gone
into. Section 9 states that nothing in the 5 preceding Sections shall
be construed to take away the remedy to which any party may be
entitled, against the master, officers or members of the crew because of injury or loss of merchandise or property, or on account
of any negligence or fraud of such master, officer or members of
the crew, even though such master or member of the crew may be
an owner or part owner of the aircraft. Its meaning is so clear
that no further discussion is needed. Section 10 prohibits any
manager, agent, master or owner of any aircraft from covenanting
that he shall be relieved from liability for loss or damage arising
from negligence, fault or failure in proper loading, storage, custody, care of proper delivery of all such property committed to
his charge. This section is self-explanatory and needs no comment.
Section 11 makes it unlawful for the owner, master, etc., of any
aircraft to enter into any covenant whereby the obligations of the
owner of such aircraft to exercise due diligence, properly equip,
man, etc., said aircraft and to make said aircraft airworthy or
whereby the obligations of the master, officers, etc., to carefully
handle and stow the cargo, care for and properly deliver same, shall
in any way be lessened or voided. This section is also self-explanatory and needs no comment.
Section 12 has been carefully and thoroughly gone into. Section 13 merely stipulates certain requirements with regard to bills
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of lading and makes such a document prima facie evidence of the
receipt of the merchandise therein described. Section 14 merely
sets forth a fine of Two Thousand Dollars for any violation of
Section 13. Section 16 states that general average and salvage
shall be payable with regard to aircraft in accordance with the
maritime law and shall constitute liens thereon, but permits parties
to modify this by contract if they so desire. Section 17 requires
that all aircraft shall file with the Secretary of Commerce a true
copy of every agreement with another such carrier, and permits
the Secretary of Commerce to disprove, cancel, or modify any
such agreement, if he finds it unjustly discriminatory or unjustly
unfair between carriers.
Section 18 requires every sale, contract of conditional sale,
conveyance, mortgage and assignment of mortgage of an aircraft or
any interests therein to be registered in the office of the Secretary
of Commerce and provides that any such sale, etc., not so recorded
shall be void against subsequent purchasers and mortgagees in good
faith, without notice. There is then an enumeration of just what
must be recorded. This section also provides that a mortgage
properly recorded as set forth, shall constitute a lien on the mortgaged airship or other aircraft in the amount of the outstanding
indebtedness secured by such aircraft and shall outrank all other
liens, except such mortgages as have been previously recorded. The
Act then further provides that upon default, such lien may be
enforced by the mortgagee by a suit in rem, in equity, and that the
court may appoint a receiver to either operate or take possession
of the mortgaged aircraft, notwithstanding the fact that the aircraft is in the possession or under the control of the person claiming a possessory common law lien.
Section 19 permits the Secretary of the Navy to authorize
members of the Navy to volunteer their services for the operation
and/or maintenance of any airship engaged in foreign commerce;
the fact that the words "and other aircraft" have been omitted
from this section is already commented on.
Section 20 permits the Secretary of the War and/or the Secretary of the Navy, to make any airports under their jurisdiction
available for use to transportation companies engaged in foreign
commerce by "airship" and then fixes proper compensation. Here
again the words "any other aircraft" are omitted. Section 21 consists of a series of definitions.
It is now my purpose to take up the Maryland Act, and, at this
point, I would like to state that the Maryland Act is almost identical
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to the Federal Act, which has just been discussed. The main
point of difference lies in the fact that all the limitations of liability and all the exemptions of liability existing in the Federal
Act comply with full force and effect in the Maryland Act, but in
addition, the Maryland Act covers all aircraft engaged in interstate
and foreign commerce. Also, the Maryland Act covers in all sections, all aircraft and is never limited to those lighter than air,
designated in four sections of the Federal Act as "airships".
It is not my intention in this article to discuss the constitutionality of the Maryland Act. It does not violate the Maryland
Constitution in any way except possibly where it attempts to place
a limitation of liability for personal injuries. The Maryland Constitution provides in Section 6, as follows:
"The right of trial by Jury of all issues of fact in civil proceedings in
the several Courts of Law in this State, where the amount in controversy
exceeds the sum of five dollars, shall be inviolably preserved."

Thus, it will be seen that the same objection to the Maryland
Act exists at this point as exists in the Federal Act, due to the
Federal constitutional provision. All damage or loss to baggage
can be limited under a contract of carriage just as is now done in
railway transportation. All death cases would be subject to the
Maryland statute, due to the fact that there was no common law
right to sue for wrongful death. The contention may be presented
that the Maryland Act attempts to regulate and is a burden upon
interstate commerce and consequently is void in toto. I do not
believe that this contention is justifiable at the present time because
the United States Government has not entered the field covered
by the Maryland Act and consequently until the United States
Government does enter this field, there is nothing to prevent a
state from so legislating. There are some practical and also some
theoretical difficulties to be overcome before aircraft carriers can
take advantage of the Maryland statute and nearly all of these
difficulties arise from and are due to the doctrine of the conflict
of laws. In February, 1931, the American Law Institute issued
two pamphlets on this subject. These pamphlets represent the
very latest word on this doctrine and combine the consensus of
opinion of the best legal minds in this country on the application of
this very confusing and difficult subject. In determining what law
shall apply to contracts, two distinct principles are nearly always
involved. The word "contracts" refers to contract of carriage between passengers and air transport operators engaged in carrying
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these passengers either from one state into another or from one
state into a foreign country-in other words, passenger flying in
interstate or foreign commerce. The two principles just alluded
to are:
(1)

The law of the place of centracting.

(2) The law of the place of performance.
"The place of contracting is the State in which the last event necessary to make a contract, occurs." (Section 333, Conflict of Laws.)
"The law of the place of performance is the State where either by
specific provision or by interpretation of the language of .the promise, the
promise is to be performed." (Section 384, Conflict of Laws.)
"The law of the place of contracting determines whether the acceptance
of goods or of a passenger for carriage creates an obligation of carriage
and when the obligation comes into existence." (Section 365, Conflict of
Laws.)
"The law of the place of contracting determines the validity of a contract limiting the carrier's liability." (Section 366, Conflict of Laws.)
Now, with regard to principle two, or "the law of the place
of performance": In order to take advantage of this Maryland
statute, it would be necessary for every common air carrier to
insert in every contract of carriage, a provision providing in effect
that all rights and liabilities of the parties thereto arising under
said contract, or in connection therewith, or growing out therefrom,
shall be determined in accordance with the laws of the State of
Maryland. If this is done, principle two will be amply taken care
of. Thus, a citizen passenger of Illinois taking off in Indiana and
having an accident in Ohio and suing in Philadelphia, would be
bound by the Maryland Act, unless the Maryland Act were contrary to the public policy of the forum, namely, Pennsylvania.
However, because the terms of the contract were made subject to
the laws of Maryland, principle two would be covered. In order
to cover principle one, namely, "the law of the place of contracting" it would be necessary for each interstate carrier to incorporate
in Maryland and have a resident agent in that State who would be
authorized to receive by wire or by telephone, the offer of each
individual contract of carriage and then it would be his duty to
send a return wire accepting the offer, to the place from which
the contemplated passage was to originate.
Telegrams are so quickly dispatched in these times that it is
safe to say that not more than one hour would be necessary to
complete this contract and generally a shorter period of time would
be sufficient. Most of the carrier companies require reservations
well in advance of the time of the departure of the plane and con-
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sequently it should be comparatively simple to complete this contract before the passenger commences his journey. By these two
methods, both principle one and principle two would be coveredi. e., the contract not only would be accepted in Maryland but
also would be subject to the laws of Maryland. Thus, under the
full faith and credit clause of the Constitution, the Courts of Pennsylvania, here used as an example, would have tremendous difficulty
in finding such a contract contrary to the public policy of Pennsylvania.
"A mere difference between the laws of two states will not render
the enforcement of a cause of action created in one state contrary to the
public policy of the other. * * * There is a strong public policy favoring the enforcement of obligations validly created by the law governing
their creation. Denial of enforcement of the following claim will result
in an undeserved benefit to the defendant. The desirability of uniform enforcement of rights acquired in other states is especially strong among
the states of the United States. The differences in policy among them
are of minor nature and for the most part relate to internal affairs. The
social interest in uniform enforcement regardless of State's lines is particularly great." (Conflict of Laws, page 175.)

Of course, if suit were brought in Maryland, the limitation of
liability as expressed in the Maryland statute, would apply with
full force and effect. Consequently, if it were stipulated in each
individual contract of carriage that any breach of contract should
be brought only in Maryland, then all plaintiffs, regardless of where
the accident occurred, or where the place of departure was, would
be compelled to sue the defendant company in Maryland.
"Parties to a contract may provide that all actions for breach of the
contract shall be brought only in a certain Court, and the Courts of other
states will usually give effect to such a provision; but the requirement can
be imposed only by consent of the parties as a term of a contract. If the
parties agree it is not like the case of one state prescribing by its statute
what the Courts of another state may do." (Conflict of Laws.)
In this analysis of the two statutes, the following points should
be carefully considered:
(1) Is it advantageous for Congress to pass any legislation
which grants exemption of liability and limitation of liability to
common air carriers engaged in foreign commerce and which purposely excludes similar carriers engaged in interstate commerce?
(2) Is the contemplated Federal legislation sufficiently clear
and explicit on all points sought to be covered?
(3) Is the contemplated Federal legislation constitutionally
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sound, both with regard to its substantive and procedural provisions ?
(4) Does the Maryland statute seek to impose a burden on
interstate commerce?
Has the Federal Government already entered the field
(5)
now covered by the Maryland statute?
(6) Until conflicting legislation is passed by the United States
Congress, cannot air transport companies successfully take full
advantage of the Maryland statute?
(7) Congress, as far as admiralty jurisdiction is concerned,
has complete power over legislation with regard to torts committed
on navigable waters. Therefore, if a plane crashes on navigable
waters and although the ensuing tort is an admiralty tort rather
than one in foreign commerce, due to the fact that its situs is on
navigable waters, may or may not Congress, by a reasonable classification of admiralty torts, permit certain limits for liability with
regard to torts ensuing from airships and at the same time permit
a different basis for liability for torts committed on vessels? In
other words, may not the present admiralty statutes remain in
effect as far as shipping is concerned but at the same time, may
not the McNary Bill validly become effective as far as aircraft
is concerned, where in both cases the torts occur on navigable waters
and as such, are in the exclusive jurisdiction of admiralty?
(8) Although a jury trial under the Constitution of the
United States is required in all common law actions, may or may
not Congress, through its power to regulate foreign commerce,
either limit the liability as in the McNary Bill, or else do away with
all liability, as in the McNary Bill, but at the same time let the
jury decide whether, based on the facts adduced in each case, exemption from liability should apply, and if the jury should find that
an exemption did not apply, then would the Constitution be violated if the jury were to be permitted to assess damages within
the limit set by Congress, as per the McNary Bill, namely, the value
of the ship and the cargo then pending. There is still another
class of cases for injured persons or property on ground, caused
by airships in foreign commerce. Congress, under its power to
regulate foreign commerce as above stated, might by law permit
passengers and carriers by contract either actually signed or by
notices posted in conspicuous places, bind the passengers with the
limited liability provisions as accepted by the passengers, either
actually or constructively, and'backed and made legal by congressional action. But under this same power to regulate foreign com-
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merce, can Congress seek to limit or exempt liability for persons
and property on the ground, who in no way have any contractual
relations whatsoever with the carrier?
(9) Does the word "regulate" as used in the Constitution
permit Congress to go to the extent, under the guise of regulation,
of practically doing away with the common law right of permitting
a passenger to have his damages assessed by a jury, simply by
permitting carriers sanctioned by law to force passengers to enter
into contractual relations which either exempts or limits the carrier. For this to be reasonable, would not a graduated scale of
premium payments, depending on size of insurance risk, taken by
each passenger, have to be unlimited in their amounts just as is
the practice now on steam railroad with regard to personal luggage. In other words, there is nothing to prevent one at the present
time from insuring his baggage for any amount he wishes, provided
the premiums are paid. This is a contractual limitation on a former
common law right and if Congress saw fit to do so, it undoubtedly
could, on the same principle, limit the carrier's liability for injury
to passengers in the same manner. But would this same principle
hold if the ultimate limitation of liability to be assumed by the
carrier were so small as to practically do away with the practical
pecuniary result, as in the McNary Bill?
(10)
For death claims, no common law right would be involved so Congress could probably, under its regulatory grant, set
any limit it saw fit, regardless of the smallness of the limit involved.
As far as procedure is concerned, can Congress force
(11)
all litigants to sue in the Federal Courts rather than in the State
Courts? As far as any admiralty torts are concerned naturally
the Federal Courts would have the original and exclusive jurisdiction but can Congress, under its power to regulate foreign commerce, force a man, injured on the ground by an object which was
dropped from an airplane, to sue in the Federal Court?
Likewise, can Congress insist that all questions of juris(12)
diction not arising under the Constitution, be brought in a Federal
Court, as between passenger and carrier?
(13) Also, would not the McNary Bill have to have included
by its provisions, planes in interstate commerce as well as in foreign commerce, even though it is admitted the planes to be covered
by the Bill were to fly only in foreign commerce? In other words,
suppose a severe storm blew one of these contemplated zeppelins
from New York to Chicago, where it crashed. Would not the Bill
for the protection of its own "infant" have to embrace this
probability?

